Écouter la conférence complète de Ben Freedman ici. Lire la transcription, en version française ici.
La seule manière (ce qui fut démontré par la suite) d’amener les États-Unis à entrer dans cette guerre était de s’assurer la coopération des Juifs sionistes en leur promettant la Palestine, enrôlant et mobilisant ainsi en faveur des alliés le pouvoir jusqu’alors insoupçonné des Juifs sionistes en Amérique et ailleurs, sur la base d’un contrat quid pro quo.
the only way (which proved so to be) to induce the American President to come into the War was to secure the co-operation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and thus enlist and mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies on a quid pro quo contract basis.
Extrait de The New Babylon, Michael Collins Piper, 2009:
In a modern context, however, the establishment of Israel in 1948 — and the intrigues surrounding it — go back to the Balfour Declaration and, as we shall see, that involved the effort by the British to get the United States involved in the war in the Old World that became known as World War I.
The Balfour Declaration — dated November 2, 1917 — written by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Britain’s Lord Rothschild asserted a “declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations” and that the British government viewed “with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object.”
In fact, the Balfour Declaration was the consequence of international intrigue that was designed specifically for the purpose of bringing the United States into the war in Europe between Britain and Germany. The intent was to utilize powerful Jewish interests in the United States in pressuring President Woodrow Wilson to provide American blood and treasure to the British war effort. In return for their assistance on behalf of Britain, the Jewish warmongers were promised Britain’s assistance in the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.
Lest anyone believe this is some extraordinary conspiracy theory, please note that in 1936, in a then-confidential memo (long ago made public) to the British Commission on Palestine, James Malcolm, a central figure in the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, stated flatly that the first object in the series of events orchestrating the declaration “was to enlist the very considerable and necessary influence of the Jews, and especially of the Zionist or Nationalist Jews, to help us bring America into the War at the most critical period of the hostilities.”
Writing in Great Britain, the Jews and Palestine, Samuel Landman — who at the period of the negotiations leading to the Balfour Declaration, was secretary to the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann (and who later served as secretary of the World Zionist Organization) — confirmed Malcolm’s assessment of the circumstances saying:The only way (which proved so to be) to induce the American President to come into the war was to secure the cooperation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and thus enlist and mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies on a quid pro quo contract basis.So what does all of this mean? To put it bluntly, simply: the Jews got the United States involved in World War I. The subsequent events that led to World War II — certainly — and later U.S. involvement in the Middle East can be summarized likewise. In short, Jewish power led to the loss of 53,000 American lives in World War I and 292,131 more in World War II — wars fought largely — if not solely — for Jewish interests. (…)
Voir aussi:
Britain’s Balfour Declaration of 1917, The Barnes Review
Benjamin H. Freedman:
Été 1916 : les Alliés à genoux, l’Allemagne propose la paix
Enregistrement intégral du discours de Benjamin Freedman Partie 1 : Partie2 – Partie 3 – Partie 4 – Partie 5 – Partie 6
The little-known origins and history of the Balfour Declaration |
The Landman Document |
An excerpt from Count Leon de Poncins State Secrets |
http://www.thebirdman.org/Index/Others/Others-Doc-Jews/+Doc-Jews-National&InternationalConspiracy&NWO/BalfourDeclarationBroughtUSIntoWWISaysJew.htm
‘If there had not been the Lusitania affair, the asphyxiating gases, or the intrigues of German and Austrian ambassadors on American territory, in which they were surely not unique, other ways would have been found to achieve the same results. No provocation would have been too severe to obtain them, since democracy was in danger and it urgently needed American intervention to come to its aid.
‘Democracy was in danger, and that is the most important point and indeed the pivot of all contemporary history. The rest is just empty meaningless phrases, fodder which is thrown to beasts who are being led to the slaughter-house.
‘The apparent spontaneity of their enthusiasm for war, which shook the American people, should not astonish those who know America, or who lived there for some years before 1914. For at that time thousands and thousands of non-Jewish people, who had nevertheless been intoxicated by a costly and clever publicity campaign, demanded at the tops of their voices that diplomatic and commercial relations should be broken off with the Tsar’s government – a measure which would gravely prejudice the American portfolio – for the sole reason that a mean and obscure little Jew, who was completely unknown in his own town, but whose international ubiquity had organized his defence, had been brought before a court of assize and the regular jury of a provincial city in the Russian empire on a charge, whether justly or unjustly, of committing a ritual murder.
‘On both occasions, the result was exactly the same: the nation which above all others claims to be free and in sovereign command of its own destiny was brainwashed to the hilt.
‘In 1914 any American would have laughed to scorn the idea that in three years time he would be struggling and suffering in France for the sake of affairs which had no connection with those of his own country.
‘And yet, when 1917 came, the same man enlisted enthusiastically. Every soldier whom we happened to interview and questioned as to his personal motives for fighting, invariably replied: ‘we are fighting for democracy’. They were one step ahead of their fellow soldiers from other nations, who went for their own country’s sake.
‘It is only when we realize that France was invaded by hundreds of thousands of inhabitants from Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, Wyoming, California, Louisiana, and subsequently from Ontario, Manitoba, Rhodesia and New South Wales, whose only possible motive was to hasten the triumph of democracy, that we begin to understand something of the power of Israel. The power to stir up a whole nation of solid, egotistical and utilitarian individuals, and to persuade them that their greatest privilege is to set out and get themselves killed at the uttermost ends of the earth, with no hope of gain for themselves or their children and almost without their understanding against or for whom they are fighting, or why, is a simply incredible phenomenon which makes one afraid when one comes to think about it.’ (E. Malynski: La Démocratie victorieuse)
‘As the Balfour Declaration originated in the War Office, was consummated in the Foreign Office and is being implemented in the Colonial Office, and as some of those responsible for it have passed away or have retired since its migrations from Department to Department, there is necessarily some confusion or misunderstanding as to its raison d’étre and importance to the parties primarily concerned. It would, therefore, seem opportune to recapitulate briefly the circumstances, the inner history and incidents that eventually led to the British Mandate for Palestine.
‘Those who assisted at the birth of the Balfour Declaration were few in number. This makes it important to bring into proper relief the services of one who, owing above all to his modesty, has hitherto remained in the background. His services however should take their proper place in the front rank alongside of those Englishmen of vision whose services are more widely known, including the late Sir Mark Sykes, the Rt. Hon. W. Ormsby Gore, the Rt. Hon. Sir Ronald Graham, General Sir George Macdonagh and Mr. G. H. Fitzmaurice.
‘In the early years of the War great efforts were made by the Zionist Leaders, Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Sokolow, chiefly through the late Mr. C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian, and Sir Herbert Samuel, to induce the Cabinet to espouse the cause of Zionism.
‘These efforts were, however, without avail. In fact, Sir Herbert Samuel has publicly stated that he had no share in the initiation of the negotiations which led to the Balfour Declaration. (England and Palestine, a lecture delivered by Sir Herbert Samuel and published by the Jewish Historical Society, February 1936.) The actual initiator was Mr. James A. Malcolm and the following is a brief account of the circumstances in which the negotiations took place.
‘During the critical days of 1916 and of the impending defection of Russia, Jewry, as a whole, was against the Czarist regime and had hopes that Germany, if victorious, would in certain circumstances give them Palestine. Several attempts to bring America into the War on the side of the Allies by influencing influential Jewish opinion were made and had failed. Mr. James A. Malcolm, who was already aware of German pre-war efforts to secure a foothold in Palestine through the Zionist Jews and of the abortive Anglo-French démarches at Washington and New York; and knew that Mr. Woodrow Wilson, for good and sufficient reasons, always attached the greatest possible importance to the advice of a very prominent Zionist (Mr. Justice Brandeis, of the US Supreme Court); and was in close touch with Mr. Greenberg, Editor of the Jewish Chronicle (London); and knew that several important Zionist Jewish leaders had already gravitated to London from the Continent on the qui vive awaiting events; and appreciated and realized the depth and strength of Jewish national aspirations; spontaneously took the initiative, to convince first of all Sir Mark Sykes, Under-Secretary to the War Cabinet, and afterwards M. Georges Picot, of the French Embassy in London, and M. Goût of the Quai d’Orsay (Eastern Section), that the best and perhaps the only way (which proved so to be) to induce the American President to come into the War was to secure the co-operation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and thus enlist and mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies on a quid pro quo contract basis. Thus, as will be seen, the Zionists, having carried out their part, and greatly helped to bring America in, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 was but the public confirmation of the necessarily secret ‘gentleman’s’ agreement of 1916 made with the previous knowledge, acquiescence and/or approval of the Arabs and of the British, American, French and other Allied Governments, and not merely a voluntary altruistic and romantic gesture on the part of Great Britain as certain people either through pardonable ignorance assume or unpardonable ill-will would represent or misrepresent.
‘Sir Mark Sykes was Under-Secretary to the War Cabinet specially concerned with Near Eastern affairs, and, although at the time scarcely acquainted with the Zionist movement, and unaware of the existence of its leaders, he had the flair to respond to the arguments advanced by Mr. Malcolm as to the strength and importance of this movement in Jewry, in spite of the fact that many wealthy and prominent international or semi-assimilated Jews in Europe and America were openly or tacitly opposed to it (Zionist movement) or timidly indifferent. MM. Picot and Goût were likewise receptive.
‘An interesting account of the negotiations carried on in London and Paris, and subsequent developments, has already appeared in the Jewish press and need not be repeated here in detail, except to recall that immediately after the ‘gentleman’s’ agreement between Sir Mark Sykes, authorized by the War Cabinet, and the Zionist leaders, cable facilities through the War Office, the Foreign Office and British Embassies, Legations, etc., were given to the latter to communicate the glad tidings to their friends and organizations in America and elsewhere, and the change in official and public opinion as reflected in the American press in favour of joining the Allies in the War, was as gratifying as it was surprisingly rapid.
‘The Balfour Declaration, in the words of Prof. H. M. V. Temperley, was a « definite contract between the British Government and Jewry » (History of the Peace Conference in Paris, vol. 6, p. 173). The main consideration given by the Jewish people (represented at the time by the leaders of the Zionist Organization) was their help in bringing President Wilson to the aid of the Allies. Moreover, officially interpreted at the time by Lord Robert Cecil as ‘Judea for the Jews’ in the same sense as ‘Arabia for the Arabs’, the Declaration sent a thrill throughout the world. The prior Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, according to which Northern Palestine was to be politically detached and included in Syria (French sphere), was subsequently, at the instance of the Zionist leaders, amended (by the Franco-British Convention of December 1920, Cmd. 1195) so that the Jewish National Home should comprise the whole of Palestine in accordance with the promise previously made to them for their services by the British, Allied and American Governments, and to give full effect to the Balfour Declaration, the terms of which had been settled and known to all Allied and associated belligerents, including Arabs, before they were made public.
‘In Germany, the value of the bargain to the Allies, apparently, was duly and carefully noted. In his Through Thirty Years Mr. Wickham Steed, in a chapter appreciative of the value of Zionist support in America and elsewhere to the Allied cause, says General Ludendorff is alleged to have said after the War that: « The Balfour Declaration was the cleverest thing done by the Allies in the way of propaganda, and that he wished Germany had thought of it first » (vol. 2, p. 392). As a matter of fact, this was said by Ludendorff to Sir Alfred Mond (afterwards Lord Melchett), soon after the War. The fact that it was Jewish help that brought USA into the War on the side of the Allies has rankled ever since in German – especially Nazi – minds, and has contributed in no small measure to the prominence which anti-Semitism occupies in the Nazi programme.’ (S. Landman: Great Britain, The Jews and Palestine, pp. 3-6)
« You forget that you did not give us Palestine as an unsolicited gift (Balfour Declaration). It was handed over as the result of a secret bargain concluded between ourselves. We have scrupulously observed our part in bringing America into the war on your side. We call on you to fulfil your obligations in turn. You are aware of our power in the United States: take care that you do not attract the hostility of Israel, otherwise you will come up against grave international difficulties. »
Count Leon de Poncins, State Secrets, 1977
John Robert – Behind the Balfour declaration

Author : John Robert
Title : Behind the Balfour declaration : Britain’s great war Pledge to Lord Rothschild
Year : 2008Link download : John_Robert_-_Behind_the_Balfour_declaration.zipPaper Presented to the Fifth International Revisionist Conference. Acknowledgements. To Benjamin H. Freedman, who committed himself to finding and telling the facts about Zionism and Communism. and encouraged others to do the same. The son of one of the founders of the American Jewish Committee, which for many years was anti-Zionist, Ben Freedman founded the League for Peace with Justice in Palestine in 1946. He gave me copies of materials on the Balfour Declaration which I might never have found on my own and encouraged my own research. (He died in April 1984.) The Institute for Historical Review is providing means for the better understanding of the events of our time. Attempts to review historical records impartially often reveal that blame, culpability, or dishonor are not to be attached wholly to one side in the conflicts of the last hundred years. To seek to untangle fact from propaganda is a worthy study, for it increases understanding of how we got where we are and it should help people resist exploitation by powerful and destructive interests in the present and future, by exposing their working in the past. May I recommend to the Nobel Prize Committee that when the influence of this organization’s historical review and search for truth has prevailed the societies of its contributors – say about 5 years or less from now – that they consider the IHR for the Nobel Peace Prize. Regrettably, some of the company in that award would be hard to bear ! …
Barnes Harry Elmer – The causes of the world war

Author : Barnes Harry Elmer
Title : The causes of the world war
Year : 1945Link download : Barnes_Harry_Elmer_-_The_causes_of_the_world_war.zipLevels or types of responsibility. In generalizing about responsibility for the World War it is necessary to be specific as to just what is meant by tnis term « responsibility. » There are some Revisionists who contend that ail of the Great Powers involved were about equally responsible. There are others who state that France, Russia and Serbia were the only leading powers in 1914 who desired a European war and that they worked cleverly to bring it on the least possible appearance of aggression. Both of these opinions would be correct if one clarifies what is meant. Those who argue for equal responsibility in this sense usually mean that, in regard to the causes of wars in general in Europe from 1870 to 1914, all the Great Powers were about equally responsible for the war system. They do not refer primarily to the crisis of 1914, but rather to the situation lying back of the July clash. Those who contend for the primary guilt of France, Russia and Serbia have in mind the responsibility for unnecessarily forcing the Austro- Serbian dispute of 1914 into a general European conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to know just what one implies when he says that everybody was guilty or that this or that group of nations was guilty. …
Barnes Harry Elmer – Who started world war one ?

Author : Barnes Harry Elmer
Title : Who started world war one ? An unbiased analysis of the causes and mitigating factors of World War One from the father of historical Revisionism
Year : 2009Link download : Barnes_Harry_Elmer_-_Who_started_world_war_one.zipPreface. Wars & the Decline of the West. This pioneering Revisionist work by the doyen of Revisionism, Harry Elmer Barnes, ends with the entrance of the U.S.A. into World War I. Thus, the final gruesome tally of the horrible and unnecessary costs of that war in terms of blood, treasure, and political disaster could not be included. …
Clark Christopher – The sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914

Author : Clark Christopher
Title : The sleepwalkers How Europe went to war in 1914
Year : 2013Link download : Clark_Christopher_-_The_sleepwalkers.zipIntroduction. The European continent was at peace on the morning of Sunday 28 June 1914, when Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie Chotek arrived at Sarajevo railway station. Thirty-seven days later, it was at war. The conflict that began that summer mobilized 65 million troops, claimed three empires, 20 million military and civilian deaths, and 21 million wounded. The horrors of Europe’s twentieth century were born of this catastrophe; it was, as the American historian Fritz Stern put it, ‘the first calamity of the twentieth century, the calamity from which all other calamities sprang’. The debate over why it happened began before the first shots were fired and has been running ever since. It has spawned an historical literature of unparalleled size, sophistication and moral intensity. For international relations theorists the events of 1914 remain the political crisis par excellence, intricate enough to accommodate any number of hypotheses. The historian who seeks to understand the genesis of the First World War confronts several problems. The first and most obvious is an oversupply of sources. Each of the belligerent states produced official multi-volume editions of diplomatic papers, vast works of collective archival labour. There are treacherous currents in this ocean of sources. Most of the official document editions produced in the interwar period have an apologetic spin. The fifty-seven-volume German publication Die Grosse Politik, comprising 15,889 documents organized in 300 subject areas, was not prepared with purely scholarly objectives in mind; it was hoped that the disclosure of the pre-war record would suffice to refute the ‘war guilt’ thesis enshrined in the terms of the Versailles treaty. For the French government too, the post-war publication of documents was an enterprise of ‘essentially political character’, as Foreign Minister Jean Louis Barthou put it in May 1934. Its purpose was to ‘counterbalance the campaign launched by Germany following the Treaty of Versailles’. In Vienna, as Ludwig Bittner, co-editor of the eight-volume collection Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, pointed out in 1926, the aim was to produce an authoritative source edition before some international body – the League of Nations perhaps? – forced the Austrian government into publication under less auspicious circumstances. The early Soviet documentary publications were motivated in part by the desire to prove that the war had been initiated by the autocratic Tsar and his alliance partner, the bourgeois Raymond Poincaré, in the hope of de-legitimizing French demands for the repayment of pre-war loans. Even in Britain, where British Documents on the Origins of the War was launched amid high-minded appeals to disinterested scholarship, the resulting documentary record was not without tendentious omissions that produced a somewhat unbalanced picture of Britain’s place in the events preceding the outbreak of war in 1914. In short, the great European documentary editions were, for all their undeniable value to scholars, munitions in a ‘world war of documents’, as the German military historian Bernhard Schwertfeger remarked in a critical study of 1929. …